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This paper offers an institutional explanation for the conflicting trends in inequality both 
across the Eurozone and within individual member states since the late 1990s. The paper 
argues that the introduction of the euro created different economic policy incentives for 
peripheral (or ‘mixed market economy,’ MME) and core (or ‘coordinated market 
economy,’ CME) member states. First, the euro’s institutional design was a political 
choice biased toward deflationary adjustment policies in times of crisis, 
disproportionately benefiting creditors and capital owners, and leading to falling incomes 
and higher unemployment in the periphery. Second, the institutional incentives of the 
Eurozone are the opposite for export-driven CMEs and demand-led MMEs during booms 
and downturns. A ‘winner-take-all, loser-pay-all’ outcome – where the Eurozone’s richer 
countries gained at the expense of the poorer ones, while at the same time widening 
domestic inequality in the periphery – was the result of political choices favoring capital 
over labor and creditors over debtors, made worse by economic policy drift at the 
European level, the lack of national democratic choice in the periphery, and the growing 
importance of organized financial interests in Brussels. 
 





1. Introduction: The Euro, Its Crisis, and Returning Patterns of Inequality 
 
The euro crisis, the most significant aftershock of the global financial crisis of 2008, has 
wreaked havoc on the process of European integration (Parsons and Matthijs 2015). The 
crisis has also generated a renewed focus on rising income inequality and increasing 
poverty levels in the Eurozone’s Mediterranean countries, as well as Ireland, caused by 
the policies of austerity and structural reform that were forced upon those countries by 
the ‘Troika,’ the institutional vehicle combining the European Commission, the ECB, and 
the IMF (Blyth 2013). At the same time, the euro crisis has fostered the return of the 
previously waning gap in living standards between prospering Northern countries like 
Germany and crisis-ridden Southern member states like Greece and Spain. 
  
What soon erroneously came to be known as the European “sovereign debt crisis,”1 and 
the EU’s economic policy responses to it, have brought an abrupt end to the ongoing and 
still very much incomplete process of economic convergence between the coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) of the Eurozone’s ‘Northern’ core and the mixed market 
economies (MMEs) of ‘Southern’ periphery (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes 
and Thatcher 2008).2 More disturbing for the EU as a whole, the crisis has in fact 
reversed much of the progress made in the 1990s and 2000s in reducing national income 
differences between its members. For example, while the ratio of per capita income of 
lagging Greece vis-à-vis relatively affluent Germany had been steadily increasing since 
the early 1990s to a high of 0.65 in 2007, it worsened again to 0.47 by 2013, a number 
close to the prevailing ratio in the early 1990s. And it is not just a Greek tragedy: the 
corresponding ratios for Italy’s and Spain’s per capita income vis-à-vis Germany’s were 
0.87 and 0.83 in 2007, and 0.74 and 0.72 in 2013, respectively (Matthijs and Blyth 2015: 
258). Additionally, rates of unemployment have been moving in opposite directions, with 
record low unemployment rates in Germany contrasted to all-time highs in Greece and 
Spain (IMF 2014). These trends are even more outspoken if one considers levels of youth 
unemployment. This adverse evolution has made a caricature of the old EU mantra of 
‘ever closer union.’ 
 
Furthermore, the crisis and the multiple social movements it spawned all over Europe in 
2011, from Occupy London in Britain to the Indignados in Portugal and Spain, have also 
led to a renewed focus by academics and policy makers alike on the substantial widening 
in income inequality within Europe’s national contexts. This trend is particularly striking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The euro crisis was in many ways the logical consequence of the US financial crisis, i.e. a private sector 
banking crisis that necessitated a public sector bailout, which left sovereigns, especially in Europe’s 
periphery, mired in debt. See Matthijs and Blyth (2015), p. 5. 
2 Note that I will refer to the countries of Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as either 
“the North,” “the core countries,” “CMEs or Coordinated Market Economies” or the “surplus” countries. 
And instead of using the popular acronym the “PIIGS,” I will refer to the countries of Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal as “the South,” “the periphery,” “MMEs or Mixed Market Economies” or the 
“deficit” countries (even though Ireland, obviously, is not a part of Southern Europe; also, it’s closer to a 
liberal market economy or LME than the Mediterranean countries, but nevertheless also can be considered 
a mixed market economy). The other original Eurozone members, such as France, Belgium, and Austria, 
are not included because they really have elements of both North and South. The countries that have joined 
the EMU since 2002, including Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are not 
included in this analysis. 
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in traditionally more ‘egalitarian’ societies such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden – all 
of which have experienced a marked increase in their national levels of inequality since 
the early 1990s – but also in already unequal societies like Britain, where inequality has 
only risen further since the crisis hit in 2008.3 The higher levels of inequality create the 
perception both at home and abroad of dwindling European solidarity and a continent 
adrift and in decline (Jones 2012). This new situation calls into question the future of 
Europe’s much-vaunted social model and strength of its universal welfare state, both of 
which are central to the EU’s ‘soft power’ projection to the wider world (Menon 2014). 
 
In sum, Europe – and the Eurozone in particular – has been experiencing two types of 
widening inequality, both of which seem to have a ‘winner-take-all’ pattern to them 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010a, 2010b). First, there has been widening domestic inequality at 
the level of the European nation state, with a steep overall rise in inequality in Northern 
Europe since the early 1990s, though a noticeable reversal occurred since the 2008 global 
financial crisis (GFC); and a somewhat distinct trend in Southern Europe, with inequality 
only starting to rise after 2008, having seen a steep fall in inequality during the two 
decades prior to 2008.4 Second, since the GFC, there has been a widening gap between 
North and South at the supranational level, i.e. within the Eurozone, with the North – 
especially Germany – being the big ‘winners’ of the crisis – measured in higher incomes 
per capita, lower inequality, and increased employment levels – and the South being the 
main ‘losers’ of the crisis – as observed in falling living standards, rising inequality, and 
steep rises in unemployment (Reisenbichler and Morgan 2013). Furthermore, capital 
owners and creditors in the North have gained disproportionately and at the expense of 
wage earners and debtors in the South between 2008 and 2013.5 
 
What has caused these opposing trends? This paper will explain the return of the North-
South gap in the Eurozone as well as the fluctuating and seemingly contradictory levels 
of inequality in both Northern and Southern member states since the introduction of the 
euro from the lens of the euro’s institutional design and the economic policies that were 
part of that design. The political choices made during the early 1990s, tying together 
different varieties of capitalism within one monetary union (Hall 2014, Regan 2014), 
instituting government policies – both monetary and fiscal – with a deflationary bias 
would eventually result in distinct ‘winner-take-all, loser-pay-all’ dynamics. In the inter-
European member state game, the cards were stacked in favor of the more prosperous 
Northern countries; while in the intra-European member state game, the institutional odds 
favored capital owners and creditors over wage earners and debtors. I will apply the 
lessons of Hacker and Pierson’s ‘Winner-Take-All Politics’ framework for the United 
States to the European context focusing on the role of policy drift at the EU level, the 
decline of the importance of electoral politics at the national level, as well as the 
increasing power of organized financial interests in Brussels. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See the papers by Anderson and Hassel, Svallfors, and Hopkin in this special issue. 
4 Though, admittedly, the countries of Southern Europe started out with much higher levels than Northern 
Europe in the late 1980s. 
5 On the role of law during the Eurozone crisis in Southern Europe, see also the paper by Cioffi and Dubin 
in this special issue. 
 3 
In order to do so, the paper will proceed in six sections. Section two will define exactly 
what is meant by income inequality, lay out Europe’s inequality puzzle in greater detail, 
and summarize the paper’s main argument. Section three briefly reviews the existing 
literature, both in economics and political science, that has delved into the causes of 
widening inequality in the advanced industrial countries since the early 1980s. Section 
four will develop a theoretical framework to help us understand the underlying incentive 
structure of Europe’s multi-state currency union, including a new typology combining 
method and burden of adjustment, and describe the differing policy incentives core and 
periphery member states faced during ‘normal’ and ‘crisis’ times. Section five will give 
some empirical evidence of the theoretical framework, contrasting the experience of 
Europe’s CMEs with its MMEs. Section six will then explain the changing patterns of 
inequality using Hacker and Pierson’s ‘winner-take-all’ lens, focusing on drift, the 
declining role of elections, and the power of financial interests. The seventh section 
concludes. 
 
2. Europe’s Inequality Puzzle 
 
Any paper dealing with inequality needs to start by carefully defining what is meant by it. 
There are significant differences between individual labor income inequality, household 
income inequality (which include capital income and returns from savings), and wealth 
inequality (which include the total stock of assets). For example, wealth inequality in 
Germany is substantially higher than the rest of Europe, as opposed to household income 
inequality, where Germany scores well below the average (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). It is 
also important to distinguish between mean and median income levels, as they could be 
very different and lead policy makers to draw the wrong conclusions. The OECD 
highlights the differences between wage dispersion among salaried employees (where 
gender differences could play a big role), individual earnings inequality among all 
workers (which includes the self-employed) versus the entire working-age population 
(including those who are inactive or unemployed), household pre-tax ‘market’ income 
inequality versus household post-tax ‘disposable’ income inequality, and household 
‘adjusted disposable’ income inequality (taking into account the actual value of public 
services like education and health) (OECD 2011a: 26). 
 
In this paper, I will focus on disposable household inequality, which adjusts overall 
market incomes for taxes and transfers, and is corrected for household size and consumer 
price index. The main advantage of using this measure is that there is plenty of 
standardized comparative data available across Europe either through the databases of 
Eurostat or the OECD. The measure also focuses on actual ‘outcomes,’ as it takes into 
account most government policies enacted to decrease market inequality, such as 
progressive income taxation, real estate taxes, and taxes on capital gains, even though it 
omits the value of publicly provided services, which could be very important for the 
lower end of the income distribution. Increases in inequality have been largely driven by 
changes in the overall distribution of wages and salaries, which account for about three 
quarters of all household incomes (OECD 2011a: 22). At the higher end of the 
distribution, however, especially at the very top, returns to capital such as overall 
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appreciation of their existing capital stock, dividends, and interest payments on savings, 
account for a much higher (and growing) share of household income than at the bottom. 
 
There exists broad consensus in both the academic literature and the economic policy 
world that income inequality has been systematically rising in most Anglo-Saxon 
economies starting in the late 1970s, while most continental European countries – with a 
few exceptions such as France and Belgium – followed suit in the late 1980s (OECD 
2011a). While average real household incomes for the whole OECD population rose by 
1.7 percent annually between the mid-1980s and late 2000s, the top decile of the income 
distribution saw its average household income grow by 2.0 percent year-on-year, while 
the bottom decile only saw an increase of 1.4 percent year-on-year (OECD 2011b).  
 
However, these averages mask significant national differences. Not all OECD members 
experienced widening inequality within that time period. Some saw the top decile’s share 
of the pie expand much faster than others. Table 1 shows the average annual percentage 
increase in real household income for the total population, and compares and contrasts it 
to the income trends for the bottom decile and the top decile between the mid-1980s and 
the late 2000s for selected Eurozone countries. One can see that the trends in the 
Eurozone’s Northern CMEs and Southern MMEs were actually very different. The 
bottom 10 percent of households in Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
all saw their incomes grow significantly less than the top 10 percent, while the reverse 
was true for Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Italy seems to be the exception to the 
North-South divide as it behaved more like a “Northern” country in that the bottom decile 
there did also much worse than the top decile (OECD 2011a: 23).6 
 









Difference b/w Top 
and Bottom 10% 
NORTH Germany  0.9 0.1 1.6 +1.5 
(CMEs) Finland  1.7 1.2 2.5 +1.3 
 
Netherlands 1.4 0.5 1.6 +1.1 
 
Luxembourg 2.2 1.5 2.9 +1.4 
      SOUTH Ireland  3.6 3.9 2.5 –1.4 
(MMEs) Spain 3.1 3.9 2.5 –1.4 
 
Greece 2.1 3.4 1.8 –1.6 
 
Portugal 2.0 3.6 1.1 –2.5 
 
Italy 0.8 0.2 1.1 +0.9 
 
 
Upon closer inspection of the national inequality data provided by Eurostat, however, 
which uses the GINI coefficient rather than income growth per decile, there appears to be 
an even more sinister inequality puzzle within the context of the Eurozone. Rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Note that Italy, like Belgium, has its own North-South gap, and has characteristics of CMEs and MMEs. 
7 Data from OECD (2011a), p. 23. 
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an overall increase in income inequality, the peculiar pattern within the Eurozone has 
been a tale of two very different ‘Europes.’ During the period starting with the 
establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998 and the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008, the Northern Eurozone’s CMEs of Germany, Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg saw rising income inequality, as measured by their 
countries’ GINI coefficients. The Southern and peripheral MMEs, including Ireland, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal actually saw falling (or constant) levels of income 
inequality.8 
 
Table 2: Selected Eurozone Countries' Change in Income Inequality (GINI Coefficient)9 
 
  
% Change (1998-2008) % Change (2008-2012) 
“NORTH” Germany  +20.80 –6.29 
(Core) Finland  +19.55 –1.52 
 
Netherlands +10.40 –7.97 
 
Luxembourg +6.54 +1.08 
    “SOUTH” Ireland  –12.06 0.00 
(Periphery) Spain –6.18 +9.72 
 
Greece –4.57 +2.69 
 
Italy 0.00 +2.90 
 
Portugal –3.24 –3.63 
 
 
Between 2008 and 2012, on the other hand, the situation went into reverse. The core 
Eurozone members saw their levels of income inequality fall, with the exception of 
Luxembourg, which experienced a small increase of just over one percent. The periphery 
countries, with the exception of Portugal and Ireland, all recorded increases in their GINI 
coefficients since the crisis. The exact figures are summarized in table 2. So far, this 
empirical puzzle has been largely ignored in the academic literature, and therefore in 
need of further exploration. 
 
In other words, after a period of broad convergence between North and South – both in 
GDP per capita and in overall levels of inequality – the onset of the global financial crisis 
has triggered a significant regression back to the levels of the early 1990s. The logical 
question to ask is: what can explain these diverging tendencies in income per capita and 
the reversal of the converging trend in national levels of inequality since 2008? I will 
offer an institutional explanation for the conflicting movements in income inequality 
across the Eurozone since the late 1990s, by showing that the introduction of the single 
currency, the euro, in 1999, created radically different policy incentives for peripheral 
countries on the one hand and core countries on the other, as well as unequal choices 
during periods of crisis.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Italy’s GINI coefficient between 1998 and 2008 remained constant at 0.31. See Eurostat, 2014. 
9 All data are taken from Eurostat (2014) and the calculations are my own. 
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The argument of this paper goes as follows. Between 1998 and 2008, lower interest rates 
due to massive capital inflows in the Southern MMEs fueled faster growth and 
consumption, increasing wages and lowering overall returns to capital, which resulted in 
falling income inequality in the South. By contrast, the only way for the richer Northern 
core to remain competitive within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was to 
practice relative wage restraint and enact structural reforms, initially decreasing the return 
to labor and increasing the return to capital, leading to widening income inequality in the 
North during the same time period. The expected result during these ‘normal’ times was 
relative economic convergence between the member states of the Eurozone – both in 
GDP per capita (due to faster growth in the periphery), and in overall levels of income 
inequality.10 
 
Between 2008 and 2013, however, the Southern MMEs had no choice but to respond to 
the euro crisis by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. These policies 
resulted in deep and long recessions, as well as widening income inequality. The 
Northern CMEs had the choice to respond to the crisis by instituting moderately 
inflationary policies domestically, which led to increasing wages and a lower return to 
capital, causing declining levels in domestic inequality. The logical outcome of the euro 
crisis was to bring about renewed divergence between its member states, both in GDP per 
capita, and in national levels of inequality. To some extent, the crisis has catapulted 
Europe back to the early 1990s, when the North-South income gap on the continent was 
significant and domestic income inequality in peripheral Europe a lot higher compared to 
the countries of the core. 
 
It is worth noting that the national ‘winners’ – including Germany, the Netherlands, 
Finland, and Luxembourg – get to choose, and have more flexibility in fiscal and labor 
market policies, while the national ‘losers’ – including Ireland and the Mediterranean 
countries – do not. Moreover, this ‘supranational’ winner-loser dynamic also results in 
greater inequality within the loser countries, but not within the winner countries. The 
Eurozone crisis, in other words, has sprouted a rather bleak and multi-level inequality 
equilibrium. While workers in the North suffered prior to the crisis, and had it relatively 
good after the crisis, the situation in the South was the reverse. Owners of capital, on the 
other hand, prospered more in the North than in the South prior to the crisis, but both 
were bailed out after the crisis. 	  
In this paper, I will argue that this ‘winner-take-all, loser-pay-all’ outcome in the 
Eurozone – where the richer countries gained at the expense of the poorer ones, while at 
the same time widening domestic inequality in the periphery – was the result of political 
choices that systematically favored capital over labor in economic policy. I will show this 
by analyzing three processes of “winner-take-all politics” first identified in the U.S. 
context by Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (Hacker and Pierson 2010a). They include (1) 
‘drift’ in economic policy at the EU level, (2) the decline of the importance of national 
democratic choice within EMU (especially in the periphery), and (3) the increased 
importance of organized financial interests in Brussels and the EU. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Note that this convergence depended on the North having been much more egalitarian than the South to 
begin with, starting in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
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3. Inequality in Europe: Brief Review of the Literature 
 
a. Economics Accounts 
 
Standard explanations in the economics literature for the increase in the overall level of 
inequality in most European countries tend to emphasize, in order of importance, the role 
of skill-biased technological change (SBTC), the effects of increased international trade 
and globalization, the impact of immigration, and the growing returns to higher education 
(Kierzenkowski and Koske 2013). 
 
The most influential explanation in the economics literature, as put forward by Katz and 
Murphy (1992), remains that widening inequality across the OECD has been driven by an 
increase in the relative demand for skills, which is caused by exogenous and skill-biased 
technological change. Acemoglu and Autor (2010) refined this view in 2010, making a 
crucial distinction between tasks and skills. What became known as the ‘routinization 
hypothesis’ posited that computerization mainly affected people with so-called ‘medium’ 
skills – like accountants, legal clerks, administrative assistants, and medical laboratory 
technicians – who were more likely to move downward rather than upward in the task 
distribution after losing their job. This put greater downward pressure on low-skilled 
workers’ wages compared to the wages of high-skilled workers and hence induced a 
polarization in the overall income distribution. The routinization hypothesis also helps to 
explain the ‘missing middle’ or squeezed middle class. 
 
Other accounts have focused on the effects of international trade and factor movements, 
though it is doubtful whether trade exposure to low-wage countries is sufficient in 
explaining the large increases in inequality (IMF 2007). The consensus seems to be that 
only about 10 to 15 percent of the rise in income inequality across the OECD is due to 
international trade (Krugman 2008). “Offshoring” or outsourcing of services abroad has 
also been found to reinforce labor market polarization, as mainly routinized tasks are 
outsourced to low-wage countries (Feenstra and Hanson 1996). Immigration overall is 
found to have a rather small impact on native workers, while the average level of 
educational attainment is found to be negatively correlated with wage inequality 
(Kierzenkowski and Koske 2013). According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
median earnings of a worker with a bachelor’s degree were 65 percent higher than the 
earnings of a high school graduate, with workers holding professional degrees such as 
law, medicine and business enjoying a 161 percent wage premium (Markovich 2014). 
 
Most recently, Thomas Piketty (2014) explained rising income inequality in the 
industrialized world as the inevitable result of the return of what he considers to be a 
fundamental law of capitalism, namely the idea that r (the rate of return to capital) over 
the long term is systematically larger than g (the overall rate of growth), making it 
capitalism’s innate “force for divergence” (Piketty 2014: 25). Piketty’s main point is that 
the falling levels of inequality during Les Trente Gloriouses were an exceptional period 
in history and that capital’s share of income, which started to grow again from the late 
1970s onwards, will only continue to expand in the absence of any political intervention. 
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However, as important as Piketty’s thesis is, it lacks a clear political theory. As Jonathan 
Hopkin (2014) has pointed out, “the very economic forces Piketty describes are 
embedded in institutional arrangements which can only be properly understood as 
political phenomena” (Hopkin 2014). 
 
b. Political Science Accounts 
 
So, while the economics literature does a great job at explaining overall upward trends in 
income inequality in the developed world, it falls short in addressing why certain 
economies have seen much larger increases than others, while others have recorded 
falling levels of inequality, or why the income gains in some countries tend to be more 
heavily concentrated at the very top of the distribution. After all, SBTC and increasing 
trade flows are ‘global’ phenomena, which for the most part impact all advanced 
industrial countries to a similar extent. 
 
The political science literature is much thinner than the economics literature on the 
subject of inequality, and differs substantially based on the country that is being studied. 
General large-N studies focusing on labor market policies and institutions have found that 
the impact of declining unionization and a lower relative minimum wage mainly affects 
the lower end of the income distribution, while government employment can be a 
mitigating factor and lead to reduced inequality (Pontussen, Rueda, and Way 2002). 
Wallerstein (1999) considered institutional and political determinants of pay inequality in 
16 countries from 1980 and 1992, and found that the most important factor in explaining 
pay dispersion was the level of wage setting. The more wage coordination is achieved 
collectively, the more egalitarian will be the overall distribution of pay. Wallerstein also 
stressed the importance of trade unions and the share of the labor force that is covered by 
collective bargaining agreements for achieving more equitable distributions of income. 
 
The OECD study Divided We Stand also focused on institutions, and confirmed that 
product and labor market regulations and institutions have become weaker over time 
(OECD 2011a: 30). Weaker employment protection legislation, a less progressive income 
tax, and declining unemployment benefit replacement rates are the most significant in 
influencing inequality levels, together with ‘upskilling’ or increased education levels. 
Pointedly, however, the OECD found that these factors were more important than trade 
integration, the deregulation of foreign direct investment, or technological progress. 
 
Other political accounts, many of them exclusively looking at income trends in the 
United States, have focused on median voter preferences (“politics as electoral 
spectacle”) or the role of organized interests and policy drift (“politics as organized 
combat”). Hacker and Pierson (2010a), who emphasize the central role of special 
interests in influencing legislation that systematically skews the income distribution in 
favor of the top 1 percent in the United States, deserve much credit for their efforts to 
bring politics back into the conversation. While Hacker and Pierson are careful to 
emphasize the organizational transformation of American politics, there are direct lessons 
that can be drawn and causal mechanisms that can be applied to the diverging trends in 
inequality in the Eurozone. Especially their focus on policy drift (continuing with the 
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same policies even as the original circumstances have changed), the decline of the 
importance of electoral politics, as well as their emphasis on organized interests as a 
major driver for policy change, may have broader relevance and application. 
 
But before we can apply Hacker and Pierson’s insights for the U.S. to the case of the 
Eurozone, we first have to further develop our theoretical argument in order to better 
understand Europe’s puzzling trends in income inequality. After illustrating the 
institutional dynamics behind inter- and intra-European inequality trends and showing 
additional empirical evidence, we will be able to parse out some of the political drivers 
behind the euro’s institutional choices and policy incentives. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework: Method versus Burden of Adjustment and Institutional 
Incentive Structure in a Multi-State Currency Union 
 
Europe’s decision at Maastricht in December 1991 to embark on the uncertain road of 
monetary union had profound consequences for national economic policymaking, not 
least by taking the option of external currency realignment off the table. Furthermore, by 
delegating the authority over monetary policy to an independent central bank with a 
strong bias towards very low inflation, and fiscal policy discretion hemmed in by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) that was signed in July 1997, joining the euro severely 
limited a member state’s options in managing their economy. Since all economic policy 
decisions are by nature fundamentally ‘political’ and ‘distributive,’ joining the euro was 
never a decision free of ideology or politics: as we will see, it favored capital over labor, 
and creditors over debtors (Friedman 2014). Going forward, any adjustment strategy 
during hard times would hurt the weaker groups disproportionally more. 
 
a. Understanding the Return of the North-South Gap: Method versus Burden of 
Adjustment during Crises 
 










 Burden of Adjustment (“Who Loses?”) 
 
























A useful way to approach the political problem of economic adjustment is to differentiate 
between the ‘method of adjustment’ a government will embrace in the face of economic 
difficulties, and which socio-economic groups – either domestic or international – will 
suffer the main ‘burden of adjustment’ (Simmons 1991). Figure 1 proposes a typology on 
how to think about the four main possible policy options or ‘shock absorbers’ in an 
economy. The method of adjustment can either be mostly via ‘internal’ (austerity or 
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demand stimulus) or via ‘external’ channels (currency devaluation or debt default). The 
main burden of adjustment can be borne by either debtors or creditors (national or 
foreign), and additionally, by either domestic workers or capital owners (even though, 
many workers are owners of capital, and plenty of capital owners receive a significant 
portion of their income from wages). 
 
The first potential national policy choice – austerity – in the top-left quadrant, usually 
involves a combination of public spending cuts and tax increases on the fiscal side and 
interest rate increases on the monetary side. Austerity is transmitted into the macro 
economy mostly via internal channels, i.e. by affecting domestic economic activity in the 
short term and lowering wages and prices in the medium term. The adjustment burden in 
the case of austerity falls on both debtors, who see the real value of the debts they owe 
increase, and on domestic workers, who tend to have relatively little savings, and might 
suffer either through lower nominal wages (and fixed rent or mortgage payments), cuts in 
benefits, less generous government services, or higher unemployment. Creditors and 
capital owners, on the other hand, will see the real value of their savings and outstanding 
loans increase, and will generally be less negatively affected. The expected result of 
austerity will be to widen income inequality between rich and poor, as the poor rely 
mainly on wages or government benefits for their income, and tend to have higher 
outstanding debts vis-à-vis their overall wealth, while the rich in general get a much 
higher percentage of their income from capital compared to the rest of society. 
 
The second possible policy choice in the upper-right quadrant – demand stimulus – is the 
other ‘internal’ method of adjustment. Demand stimulus usually entails direct increases in 
government spending and cuts in taxes on the fiscal side, or interest rate cuts on the 
monetary side. Demand stimulus normally has the short-to-medium term effect of 
stimulating domestic economic activity by pushing up aggregate demand, and raising 
prices and nominal wages in the medium term. In this case, the burden of adjustment will 
fall disproportionately on creditors and capital owners, who will experience a drop in the 
real value of their capital and savings, and a lower nominal return. Debtors and workers 
are likely to benefit, either through a lowering of the real value of their outstanding loans, 
higher nominal wages, lower unemployment, or better employment prospects. The 
expected result of demand stimulus is therefore lower income inequality between rich and 
poor, as the bottom of the income distribution sees its wages go up faster than the top of 
the distribution, which also sees a lower return to capital. 
 
The two other domestic policy choices in the bottom row of table 1 primarily affect 
economic activity through the balance of payments. For that reason, I refer to these as the 
two ‘external’ methods of adjustment. In the bottom-left quadrant, a government can 
choose a policy of devaluation, i.e. to lower the value of its currency vis-à-vis its main 
trading partners. Devaluation boosts exports and makes domestic firms more competitive 
with foreign firms, but lowers the purchasing power parity of workers and pensioners, 
whose nominal incomes are fixed. The latter bear the brunt of the adjustment since 
devaluation usually goes hand in hand with higher prices of imported goods and services. 
Debtors who have outstanding loans in foreign currencies will also be significantly worse 
off. However, devaluation is a bit more complicated and does not so neatly fit into the 
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quadrant, since workers in export industries will likely keep their jobs, and might even 
see wages increase, and therefore stand to benefit from devaluation. And obviously 
capital owners will also see their purchasing power damaged by devaluation, unless they 
have invested most of their capital abroad. So, devaluation tends to hit debtors and 
workers more, but also harms capital owners, depending on their consumption and 
investment patterns. It is probably the response that spreads the burden of adjustment the 
most equally across society. 
 
The final policy choice – default – signifies that the government chooses not to make 
good on its promise to pay back its outstanding sovereign debt, either partially or not at 
all, which will mainly affect the creditors to the government and capital owners in the 
short term. In the case of debt restructuring, the government’s creditors could either be 
domestic citizens or foreign nationals. If foreign nationals hold most of the outstanding 
debt, the default option becomes considerably more attractive, given that the domestic 
fallout from default will be relatively contained, passing on the burden of adjustment to 
foreigners. This final option usually leads to a deep recession caused by massive capital 
flight, which will affect all socio-economic groups in society, and is usually considered 
by far the worst option of all four, and is only ever used as a last resort. 
 
Between 1945 and the mid-1970s – a period of fast growth and falling inequality all over 
the advanced industrial world – countries could utilize all four economic policy tools (or 
a combination thereof). What Ruggie (1982) called the “embedded liberal” compromise, 
which was struck in 1944 at Bretton Woods, had incorporated the main lessons from the 
Great Depression and allowed countries to combine internal (full employment) with 
external (balance of payments) equilibrium through a system of fixed exchange rates, 
capital controls and domestic discretion over monetary and fiscal policy. Nixon’s closure 
of the gold window in 1971 heralded the beginning of a new era of flexible exchange 
rates, deregulation, and rising international capital flows. As a result, most industrialized 
countries – including the U.S., Japan, and Britain, and later the emerging economies of 
China, India and Brazil – kept all four policy tools firmly on their menus. While 
everybody talked the talk of market discipline and strict economic policy rules during the 
early 1990s, in practice they were all careful enough to preserve their domestic fiscal and 
monetary policy levers with a variety of capital controls, exchange rate measures, and 
downright prohibitions (Matthijs 2012). In other words, they all preserved the main tenets 
of the embedded liberal compromise (Helleiner 2014). 
 
The exception was continental Europe, where France and Germany, along with other 
members of the then European Community (EC), gradually surrendered their national 
economic sovereignty and eventually agreed to tie their economic fate together by 
creating a single currency – the euro – in the early 1990s. With the euro’s adoption, EMU 
members put in place a forever-fixed exchange rate to supplant their national currencies, 
controlled by an independent central bank focused exclusively on price stability, but with 
no de facto lender of last resort functions or common debt instrument. By doing so, 
European leaders removed one policy tool, devaluation, from their menus of choice, and 
made the other, demand stimulus, a lot harder by signing onto a Stability Pact with strict 
fiscal rules. Given the growing importance of international financial markets, and the 
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importance of sovereign credit ratings for the liquidity of most countries’ bond markets, 
default also became a much less appealing option. In effect, this left austerity as the only 
realistic policy option (Blyth 2013, Matthijs 2014b). 
 
By constructing the euro, European elites ‘disembedded’ the Bretton Woods compromise 
from their national politics, but without putting in place any supranational fiscal transfer 
mechanisms to guarantee solidarity in times of stress. During a crisis, international 
commitments would take precedence over domestic concerns, just like they did during 
the interwar gold standard (Eichengreen 1996). Most advanced industrial countries – 
from the U.S. to Britain, and Japan to Brazil – could spread the burden of adjustment 
over their political economy’s different constituencies, making the politics of adjustment 
during both good times and hard times a lot more sustainable and less overtly ‘political.’ 
In the Eurozone, on the other hand, as we will see in the next subsection, there are two 
different institutional dynamics. The economic policy tool a country can wield depends 
on a country’s ‘structural’ position in the currency union (core versus periphery) or what 
type of market economy it is (CME vs. MME) as well as the particular phase of the 
business cycle the Eurozone as a whole finds itself in (expansionary or contractionary). 
 
b. Explaining Divergent Trends in Domestic Inequality: Different Institutional 
Incentives for Economic Policy in Core and Periphery 
 
While Eurozone members’ hands have been tied a lot more severely than non-Eurozone 
members since the late 1990s, especially when it comes to ‘external’ adjustment, the 
institutional incentives are very different for Northern core and Southern periphery, as 
summarized in figure 2, where ‘w’ stands for the real wage rate (or return to labor), ‘r’ 
for the real interest rate (or return to capital), and ‘g’ for the overall growth rate. 
 
In the early 1990s, wages were a lot higher in the North compared to the South, while 
interest rates were a lot higher in the South compared to the North. The formation of a 
currency union, and the preparations towards this end in the 1990s, led to large capital 
flows from North to South in search of higher yields, and in the secure knowledge that 
they no longer faced any exchange rate risk, as devaluation was now firmly off the table, 
and no rational investor truly believed the no-bailout clause (Matthijs 2014a, Jones 2012). 
Furthermore, as capital flows accelerated from North to South, the core countries realized 
that the only realistic way to compete in a currency union with the lower wage periphery 
members was to restrain growth in their overall wages and prices (Johnston and Hancké 
2009, Hancké 2013). So, due to the euro’s institutional design, Northern countries saw 
their best option as pursuing broadly ‘deflationary’ policies, or austerity, which would 
lead to lower wages, higher profits, and therefore higher return on capital, together with 
the already slightly higher returns on capital that had been invested in the Southern 
periphery. Not surprisingly, the outcome during ‘normal’ times in the North was 
widening income inequality. 
 
The periphery, on the other hand, initially saw falling interest rates, thanks to the capital 
inflows from the North, where returns were lower due to the diminishing returns of a 
much higher capital stock. Lower interest rates fueled investment and consumption, and 
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allowed the periphery to pursue ‘inflationary’ policies by discretion during normal 
economic times, resulting in higher wages (Hancké 2013).11 The combination of higher 
wages and lower returns to capital in the periphery during a period of boom in the 
business cycle logically led to falling levels of inequality in the periphery. Higher rates of 
growth in the South and lower rates of growth in the North had the overall effect of broad 
convergence in absolute levels of GDP per capita. Applying Piketty (2014) his basic 
framework, we observe r>g in the core during boom times, leading to increasing levels of 
inequality, and g>r in the periphery, leading to falling levels of inequality. 
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The story is reversed during downturns or recessions, however. The MMEs of the 
periphery now have no choice but to follow broadly deflationary policies – by 
institutional design as we have seen earlier. This lowers wages and increases returns to 
capital through higher interest rates on the countries’ sovereign bonds. Spending cuts and 
tax increases mainly hurt wage earners and workers who rely on government services 
much more than wealthier capital owners. In addition, structural reforms initially have the 
effect of increasing the level of unemployment, especially for the young and the least 
skilled workers who tend to be concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution. The 
outcome of these policies is to make the recession worse, as ‘r’ shoots up and ‘g’ turns 
negative, resulting in higher levels of inequality.  
 
The core of a currency union during a downturn has more discretion, thanks to falling 
interest rates due to capital flight to safety from the South, which gives them a little more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that there was a significant difference in the South between the ‘competitive’ manufacturing sector, 
where wages were restrained by international competition, while the sheltered, public, and non-tradable 
services sectors did see significant wage increases. See also Hopkin 2015. 
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room to maneuver. This can result in ‘r’ being slightly lower than ‘g’ and therefore result 
in lower inequality. The CMEs of the core can choose to let their automatic stabilizers 
kick in, and even enact some stimulus and mildly inflationary policies, which will have 
the effect of increasing wages. Of course, they do not have to follow this path, but at least 
both firms and governments have the agency to do so if that is what they choose. The 
main point is that falling rates of return to capital and relatively higher wages in the core 
during downturns in the currency union can actually lead to falling levels of inequality. 
Positive rates of growth in the North and negative growth rates in the South lead to 
renewed divergence in overall standards of living. 
 
The main point of figure 2 is to make the distinction between deflationary policies – 
which are not chosen by the national government in question, but have to be implemented 
quasi-automatically and by institutional design – and inflationary policies – which 
governments can enact by discretion if they choose to do so. Whether the inflationary 
path is actually taken by the core countries will depend on the economic ideas held by the 
elites in charge of those economies and on how much fiscal room for maneuver there is 
(Blyth 2002, Matthijs 2011 and 2014a). 
 
5. North versus South: From Convergence to Divergence (1990 – 2013) 
 
Let me summarize the previous section in concise terms. When the currency union is in 
its overall phase of economic expansion, there will be convergence in both standards of 
living and inequality levels between core and periphery, with the periphery gaining 
mostly at the expense of the core. During periods of economic downturn, there will be 
divergence in standards of living and inequality levels between core and periphery, with 
the core gaining at the expense of the periphery. The theoretical framework of figure 2 
broadly corresponds to the inequality data in table 2. In this section, I will provide further 
evidence and put some more empirical flesh on the theoretical bones, before  
 
 a. Eurozone: Between-Country Economic Convergence and Divergence 
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, after the 1992-93 EMS crises, it became clear to financial 
market participants that the European Union was serious about introducing its common 
currency by the end of the decade. In anticipation of further economic convergence, and 
with all future EMU members implementing austerity measures to bring their economies 
into line with the Maastricht Treaty’s ‘convergence criteria,’ Northern capital – ever in 
search of higher yields – started to flow into Southern Europe, taking advantage of the 
pending evaporation of any future exchange rate risk and acting on the assumption that 
the fiscal and structural reforms underway in the 1990s would be consolidated by the 
euro’s launch. From a financial markets point of view, this resulted in yield convergence 
of sovereign bonds, which held until well after the global financial crisis hit in 2008. 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution in real GDP per capita in the Eurozone starting in 1994 for 
three ‘Northern’ and four ‘Southern’ member states. Let us compare Spain and Germany 
for example, as they are both in the ‘middle’ of their respective groups when it comes to 
living standards. While the gap in income per capita between Germany and Spain in 1994 
was €6,696, it had fallen to €5,181 by 2007. But due to the effects of the GFC and the 
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euro crisis, the gap had widened again in just six years to €9,000 by 2013 – a much 
bigger gap than back in 1994. The gap between the Netherlands and Greece – the North’s 
best and the South’s worst performer – was €14,749 in 2007 and €17,786 in 2013. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution in Real GDP per capita in 2005 Euros (1994 – 2013)12 
 
 
The convergence and divergence between North and South is even more striking when 
one looks at unemployment. Ireland, with an unemployment rate of 19 percent in 1991, 
and Spain, with an unemployment rate of over 24 percent in 1994, saw their respective 
rates gradually fall to around 4.5 percent and 8.2 percent by 2007, when their 
unemployment situation went into stark reverse, back to highs of 14.7 percent in Ireland 
in 2012 and 26.9 percent in Spain in 2013. In 2007, all eight countries (both core and 
periphery) had an unemployment rate somewhere between a low of 3.5 percent (the 
Netherlands) and a high of 8.7 percent (Germany). By 2013, the North-South gap was 
back in unemployment. The four Northern countries all had unemployment rates of 8 
percent or below, with Germany at 5.6 percent, Luxembourg at 6.5 percent, the 
Netherlands at 7.1 percent and Finland at 8 percent. The five periphery states saw their 
unemployment rates at 12.5 percent in Italy, 13.7 percent in Ireland, 17.4 percent in 
Portugal, 26.9 percent in Spain, and 27 percent in Greece (IMF 2014). 
 
 b. Eurozone: Within-Country Inequality Convergence and Divergence 
 
On the issue of inequality within countries, figure 4 shows the evolution of the adjusted 
wage share as a percentage of the total economy for both core and periphery Europe, 
based on data from the European Commission. The left hand panel has the data of three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 IMF (2014), constant 2005 euro prices. 
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EMU core countries (Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands). One can observe a fall of 
the overall wage share from well above 60 percent in all three countries in the early to 
mid 1990s to a low of around 55 percent in 2007. Since the crisis, remarkably, wage 
shares as a percentage of total GDP have recovered to close to 60 percent again in the 
North. The evidence in the right hand panel showing the periphery countries is a bit more 
mixed. Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece all see their wage share decline starting in the 
early 1990s, bottom out in the early 2000s (mid 2000s for Spain), and then peak between 
55 and 60 percent in 2007. With the exception of Italy, all see the overall wage share fall 
quite steeply after 2008. Greece is the most extreme case, with a wage-to-GDP share of 
62.4 percent in 1990, down to 48 percent in 2013, and Ireland dropping from above 60 
percent in the early 1990s to just above 50 percent in 2013. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of Adjusted Wage Share (% of Total Economy): Core vs. Periphery (1990-2013)13 
 
Core: Wages (% of Total GDP) Periphery: Wages (% of Total GDP) 
  
 
Figure 5: Real Wage Growth in CMEs vs. MMEs (1998-2013)14 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 European Commission (2014) 
14 Measured as (Nominal Wage Growth – Labor Productivity Growth) (period average). Source: European 
Commission (2014): Ameco Database. 
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While the falling overall share of wages in the economy can explain the widening levels 
of income inequality in most European countries during the 1990s, the trend is in 
opposing directions during the 2000s, with further decreasing wage shares in the North 
deepening inequality until 2008 and improving wage shares in the South lowering 
inequality. After 2008, the reverse is true. Figure 5 shows real wage growth between 
1998 and 2013 for both Northern CMEs and Southern MMEs. It is immediately clear that 
real wages in the South rose much faster than in the North during the upturn of the 
business cycle, while most of the periphery saw real wage cuts during the bust. Figure 5 
also underscores faster wage growth in Germany during the euro crisis, compared to the 
decade before that. Bob Hancké (2013) has argued that it was much easier for CMEs 
during the boom to keep wages in check, while MMEs lacked the central wage 
bargaining mechanisms CMEs had, leading to much faster wage growth in the South’s 
public and sheltered sectors, though not in their manufacturing sectors, where wages were 
kept in check by international competition. 
 
The evolution in the cost of capital in the Eurozone is well known by now, and does not 
need to be repeated here. The cost of capital in the periphery was much higher in the 
South compared to the North in the 1990s, saw broad convergence after the introduction 
of the euro, and has seen a wide divergence again since 2010. Starting with widening 
yield spreads between MMEs and CMEs, plus a monetary transmission mechanism that 
has been broken since 2010 (with the ECB trying to do whatever it takes to fix it), the 
real cost of capital in the North is again much lower than in the South (Matthijs 2014a). 
 
Figure 6: Growth Rate (g) versus Return to Capital (r) in Germany, Spain, and Greece (1998-2013)15 
 
(a) g (blue) vs. r (orange) (1998-2009) (b) g (blue) vs. r (orange) (2010-2013) 
  
 
Figure 6 shows additional evidence of the ‘Piketty effect’ in the Eurozone for Germany, 
Greece and Spain. Germany saw an average growth rate of just 1 percent during the 
decade prior to the euro crisis, well below its average real interest rate (or return to 
capital) which was above 2.5 percent (g < r), while since 2010, Germany has seen an 
average growth rate of just over 2 percent with a very low real interest rate of just 0.25 
percent (g > r). The exact reverse was true for Greece and Spain. Both periphery 
countries experienced faster growth rates of close to 3 percent during the boom, with 
interest rates between 1.5 and 2 percent (g > r). Since the crisis, both countries have seen 
negative growth rates, and much higher real interest rates (r > g). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 European Commission (2014), IMF (2014), OECD (2014), and own calculations. 
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6. Europe’s Inequality Dynamics through the Lens of ‘Winner-Take-All’ Politics 
 
The economic policies that were implemented – both at the EU and national levels – 
throughout the late 1990s and 2000s were the result of certain choices that were made 
during the early 1990s, and have been reinforced since then. Those choices at the time 
were deeply political and would have serious distributive consequences over time. As 
Jonathan Hopkin has argued, rather than a purely economic phenomenon of growth rates 
(g) and interest rates (r), the “forces Piketty describes are embedded in institutional 
arrangements which can only be properly understood as political phenomena (Hopkin 
2014). Especially the policy responses to the global financial crisis and euro crisis were 
not mere functional reactions to objective economic problems. Certain choices were 
made, and those choices would favor certain groups in the political economy over others. 
So, how can we better understand why those specific choices were made in the first 
place? 
 
Hacker and Pierson (2010a, 2010b) showed quite convincingly in the case of the U.S. 
that the widening levels of inequality – especially the concentration of wealth at the very 
top – were also due to inherently political dynamics. Three of the processes they 
identified are particularly relevant in the case of the Eurozone, as they either led to the 
introduction of those particular policies or helped in sustaining them, even as 
macroeconomic conditions took a dramatic turn for the worse. They are (1) the role of 
economic policy ‘drift,’ (2) the significant decline of democratic choice at the national 
level or ‘politics as electoral spectacle’ (especially in the case of the periphery), and (3) 
the key role of the financial lobby in Brussels, representing the interests of capital 
owners, or the ‘politics as organized combat’ (Hacker and Pierson 2010a: 169). 
 
First, government economic policy – both at the national level and at the EU level – 
played a central role in driving the curious inequality patterns across Europe. Not only 
did the single mandate of the ECB, with an exclusive monetary policy focus on low 
inflation, have a bias in favor of capital owners and creditors, the same was true for fiscal 
policy, which due to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact also had a consistently 
deflationary bias. Once the euro crisis hit, and the Troika was put in charge of 
implementing long-term structural reforms in the periphery, both labor market and 
financial policies likewise systematically favored capital over labor (Cioffi and Dubin, 
2014). While the euro crisis debate in Germany contrasted ‘saintly’ Northern creditors 
with ‘sinning’ Southern debtors (Fourcade 2013, Matthijs and McNamara 2014), the 
policy drift that firmly kept holding on to the narrow mandate of the ECB, as well as the 
strengthening of the rules of the SGP through the new Fiscal Pact, was far from neutral, 
as it they had serious redistributive implications. The EU policy response to the crisis – 
combining austerity with structural reform in the South – meant that the burden of 
adjustment would disproportionately fall on the periphery. 
 
Second, the onset of the euro crisis signaled the decline of the importance of national 
elections, especially in the periphery, as observed in the rise of protest parties on both left 
and right, and the end of long-standing and relatively stable patterns of political 
competition between center-left and center-right (Hopkin 2015). Most dramatically in 
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Italy and Greece, democratic governments were replaced with former EU officials in 
November 2011, with Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos taking the helm of technocratic 
governments in Rome and Athens respectively. Both Monti and Papademos were in 
charge of implementing the austerity cuts and structural reforms the Troika had 
demanded in return for direct financial support (in the case of Greece), and tacit support 
by the ECB (in the case of Italy). Even in France, where the socialist François Hollande 
ousted sitting Gaullist president Nicolas Sarkozy on the promise to reinstate broadly 
inflationary policies to stimulate growth, it became clear after a couple of months that 
new president Hollande would have to continue on the austere path of his predecessor 
and implement long-term structural reform policies. 
 
With ‘grand coalitions’ between center-left and center-right mathematically needed to 
‘stay the course’ and avoid financial ruin, this also marked the end of any real democratic 
choice in Europe’s peripheral countries, sowing the seeds for the continued rise of 
extremist parties. Rather than taking place in the context of national elections, the real 
battle during the euro crisis took place in Brussels and Berlin, where the debate was 
mainly held between EU policymakers, technocrats and financial experts.  
 
Finally, while the power of financial interests and big business lobbies in Brussels is a 
topic that thus far has been under researched, there is some preliminary evidence that 
points to its growing power. According to Mahoney (2007), the U.S. institutional context 
of direct elections combined with private campaign finance is much more likely to lead to 
‘winner-take-all’ outcomes biased in favor of wealthier business interests, compared to 
the EU. Mahoney shows how the lack of those institutional characteristics in Brussels 
often leads “to much more balanced policy compromises with more advocates achieving 
some of their policy goals” (Mahoney 2007: 35). There are however strong reasons to 
believe that the financial industry in the EU has gained in influence since 2007, at the 
expense of organized labor. Not only has the financial lobby gained in clout since the 
GFC, they also occupy a privileged position in many of the EU’s official advisory boards. 
 
A joint 2014 report by Corporate Europe Observatory, the Austrian Federal Chamber of 
Labor and the Austrian Trade Union Federation has found that the financial industry 
spends a yearly total of €120 million on lobbying activities in Brussels and employs well 
over 1,700 lobbyists (Wolf et al 2014). With over 700 official organizations in Brussels, 
the financial industry outnumbers civil society organizations and labor unions by a factor 
of more than seven, “with an even stronger dominance when numbers of staff and 
lobbying expenses are taken into account” (Wolf et al 2014: 3). The report’s 
(conservative) estimate is that the financial lobby outspends all the other organizations 
lobbying the EU “by a factor of more than 30.” Furthermore, Wolf et al find that in 15 of 
the 17 expert groups that the European Commission regularly consults business and 
industry interests dominated. 
 
In sum, some of the ‘winner-take-all’ dynamics that Hacker and Pierson observe in the 
United States also seem to be present at the EU level. Since the crisis, EU policies have 
not only been characterized by drift – i.e. instituting the same austerity policies of the 
1990s boom during conditions of recession between 2010 and 2013 – but EU politics has 
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also slowly moved away from ‘electoral spectacle’ to ‘organized combat,’ pitting capital 
against labor, and debtors against creditors. All three dynamics described in this section 
warrant more detailed future research. 
 
7. Conclusion: Winner-Take-All, Loser-Pay-All Europe? 
 
This paper has proposed an institutional explanation for the contradictory trends in 
income inequality in the Eurozone since the late 1990s: while inequality further widened 
in the North of Europe, following the lead of the United States and the United Kingdom, 
inequality actually started to decline in EMU’s periphery in the early 2000s, with both 
trends reversing after 2008. Going beyond the ‘standard’ explanations in economics and 
political science, this paper has argued that the particular institutional design of the euro 
gave different incentives for economic policymaking in both core and periphery, with 
significant consequences for overall standards of living and national levels of inequality. 
 
During the upward phase of the currency union’s business cycle, this led to broad 
convergence in the Eurozone, with faster growth in the periphery, and slower growth in 
the core. Wage suppression and higher returns to capital in the North led to widening 
inequality, while wage increases and lower returns to capital in the South resulted in 
falling levels of inequality. During an economic downturn, the story went into reverse. 
The “winner-take-all” northern CMEs have benefited from the euro crisis through lower 
interest rates, faster growth, and relatively mild austerity measures and reforms, with 
some maneuvering room for modest wage increases. Not only is growth faster in the 
North, inequality levels also improved. The “loser-pay-all” southern MMEs have suffered 
from higher debt-to-GDP ratios, much higher interest rates, negative growth, and 
Brussels-imposed austerity measures and structural reforms. Not only have standards of 
living fallen for everyone, inequality has also gotten worse in the periphery. 
 
These opposing trends in income inequality should be seen and explained as deeply 
political phenomena based on public policy choices that systematically favored the 
interests of capital owners over workers, and creditors over debtors. The three main 
‘winner-take-all’ dynamics that are behind Europe’s inequality patterns are policy drift, 
the decline of the importance of national elections in the periphery in policymaking, and 
the rise of organized interests in Brussels, and the increased power of financial lobbying 
firms in the European Union. Since these patterns of inequality were by no means 
inevitable economically, they could also be reversed by political choice. The point is that 
they were not. 
 
The irony is that the creation of the euro in 1991 at Maastricht was meant to further unite 
Europe by bringing about economic convergence, thereby preserving the European social 
model. The first decade of the euro seemed to deliver the goods. However, with the onset 
of the euro crisis, the Eurozone has experienced renewed economic divergence, 
questioning not only the sustainability of the European social model, but also the future 
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